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Abstract  
Since the fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, a neoliberal 
discourse has dominated the thinking of the political elite in the post-communist countries, 
paving the way for unprecedented mass privatisation, economic deregulation, and other 
market reforms. In this article, we study the development of public support for market 
economy principles in post-communist countries compared to other European countries 
during the 1999-2008 period, which is the period that directly followed the initial stage of 
market transformation. We use data from the European Value Survey covering 22 European 
countries for the years 1999/2000 and 2008/2009. In addition to analysing the trends, we 
apply multilevel regression models to study the determinants and levels of support for the 
market economy in post-communist and other European countries. We find that, when 
controlling for individual and country-level variables, a significant increase in support for 
market economy principles has taken place in the post-communist cluster, which is not the 
case in the other countries. There is some inconsistency in support for the individual 
principles of market economics: support exists in post-communist countries for the notion that 
the state should be responsible for the social and economic well-being of its inhabitants and 
for state regulation of the economy, while support is high for some market economy 
principles, such as free competition and private ownership. In other words, support for some 
kind of social market seems to prevail among those living in post-communist countries, based 
on the notion that the state should combine a market economy with relatively generous social 
policies.  
Key words: market economy, post-communist countries, free competition, private ownership, 
state regulation of economy, welfare attitudes 
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Introduction 
During the initial economic transformation period in the 1990s, neoliberalism dominated the 
public discourse in the European post-communist countries, as privatisation, economic 
liberalisation and deregulation, competitiveness, and growth were among the most highly 
prioritised objectives [Ferge 1997; Offe 1996]. The fall of communism coincided with the 
peak of neoliberalism’s global diffusion and there were no influential transnational networks 
advocating alternatives to neoliberal theories [Ban 2016:23]. Thus, the post-communist 
countries have prioritised policies that support these objectives. Even in the latter stage of the 
economic transformation (during the 2000s), these countries often pursued more radical 
market-oriented reforms than other EU countries, such as implementing a flat tax, reducing 
corporate taxes, and privatising the pension systems [Appel and Orenstein 2016]. The 
implementation of market reforms , however, did not entail a simple transmission of market 
fundamentalism principles; rather entailed adopting them into the context of the transition to a 
market economy. Thus, local conditions and external pressures played a role [Ban 2016]. In 
particular, the reforms to maximise markets and competition were balanced with state 
intervention in such areas as economic protectionism. In addition, policy makers in the post-
communist countries deliberately used social policies to prevent public protest against the 
reforms [e.g. Offe 1996; Vanhuysse 2006] and have developed various types of hybrid 
welfare regimes that combine liberal policies with conservative-Bismarckian and social-
democratic universalist policies [Cerami 2006; Inglot 2008; Hemerijck 2013; Kuitto 2016].  
 The market reforms that have taken place in the post-communist countries raise questions 
as to how the population views these reforms and whether they are legitimate and politically 
sustainable in the long term. This is particularly interesting given the fact that people have 
gained decades of experience with the market reforms, and the economic and societal contexts 
have changed over the years (e.g. due to population ageing and increasing pressures on public 
budgets). Previous studies show that there is support for revising some of the radical market 
reforms in the post-communist countries, while others show that support for market principles 
is lower than in other European countries (see below). In addition, previous studies confirm 
strong public support for welfare state intervention and redistribution policies in the post-
communist countries because of deeply-rooted egalitarian values among the population 
stemming from the communist legacy [Andreß and Heien 2001; Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 
2003; Dallinger 2010]. Furthermore, as the compensation/government protection hypothesis 
predicts, the experience of economic hardship during transition to a market economy 
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increases support for welfare policies [e.g. Vis et al. 2011]. Given that post-communist 
countries experienced hardship during the transition to a market economy, the legitimacy of 
market reforms may weaken over time. Orenstein [2009] argues that the neoliberal economic 
reforms have brought mixed results: rapid economic transformation at the beginning  of the 
transition as well as increased vulnerability to global economic crisis and capital flows later, 
have led to increases in unemployment, poverty, mortality and declines of fertility (depending 
on country). According to the Life in Transition survey conducted in 2006 by EBRD, most 
people in these countries reported in 2006 that they were economically better off under 
communism.      
 This paper analyses how public support for market economy principles developed during 
the 1999-2008 period in the post-communist countries compared to other European countries. 
This question concerns the legitimacy and political sustainability of previous and ongoing 
economic reforms. One may expect that attitudes to market principles would diverge between 
post-communist countries and the rest of Europe given their different starting points, the 
communist legacy, and the different societal, economic and political conditions at the 
beginning of the 1990s. With this in mind, we investigate whether the communist legacy is 
fading in the public mind over time in the post-communist countries. In particular, the unique 
experience of the public gained during the transition period may become more important than 
the communist legacy. The question as to convergence/divergence between the post-
communist countries and other European countries is interesting given that the impact of the 
communist legacy in combination with the unique experience of radical and rapid market 
transformation in post-communist countries has not yet been studied much.  
 Our study contributes to the discourse on attitudes toward economic reforms, as we focus 
on the 1999-2008/9 period to compare attitudes during the transition period with attitudes in 
the post-transition period and examine how the legitimacy of market reforms is changing.  
 
Theoretical assumptions 
In this section, we first discuss the market reforms that have occurred in the post-communist 
countries since 1989 in order to provide the empirical and theoretical background for our 
study. We then discuss what previous studies have concluded about attitudes to market 
reforms in both post-communist countries and other countries.  
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Market reforms in post-communist countries 
Economic and structural reforms in post-communist countries helped to establish the 
principles of markets, competition, and open trade in the public discourse. The open, market-
based economy promotes individual initiative and self-interest (compare e.g. Barr 1994; 
Fischer and Gelb 1991; Kórnai 1997; Offe 1996; Švejnar 2002).2 The market reforms were 
accompanied by economy stabilisation measures such as wage and inflation controls and 
public deficit alleviation. Social protection measures were introduced to alleviate the negative 
social consequences of the transition to a market economy, to enhance social cohesion, and to 
prevent the public’s resistance to the market reforms that were adopted [e.g. Bohle and 
Greskovits 2007; Offe 1996; Orenstein 2001; Roland 2002; Vanhuysse 2006]. 
Specific features of the market reforms in post-communist countries may have 
influenced the public’s attitudes to and support for the reforms. Some authors who study 
market reforms in post-communist countries claim that neoliberalism (in the Baltic countries), 
or ‘embedded neoliberalism’ (in the Visegrad countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia), has dominated policymaking and that social protection has become 
subordinated to the objective of competitiveness [e.g. Bohle and Greskovits 2007; Van 
Apeldoorn 2002]. Scholars have also noted that privatisation policies in post-communist 
countries were not accompanied by the development of the appropriate institutions for 
regulating the markets. This was evident in the ineffective functioning of the legal systems, 
the weak standards of fiscal discipline, and high levels of corruption [e.g. Williams and Balaz 
1999; Estrin 1994; 2008]. Consequently, strategic decisions regarding privatisation were 
largely determined by the political and social interests of the elite, as they used their 
privileged access to political power to accumulate wealth. Indeed, the privatisation methods 
were quite innovative due to the small stock of domestic private savings [Estrin 2008], but 
they often led to serious problems due to the lack of regulation. For example, the voucher 
privatisation scheme in the Czech Republic led to fraud and the outright theft of assets by 
fund managers, so-called tunnelling [Estrin 2008]. Moreover, before any formal privatisation 
took place in post-communist countries, members of the ruling communist nomenklatura 
engaged in ‘spontaneous privatisation’ through the blatant theft of state assets. Desai and 
Olofsgard [2006] argue that, despite the positive effects of market reforms, citizens in post-
communist countries have blamed market reforms for endemic corruption [e.g. Kaufmann and 
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Siegelbaum 1996], political deadlock, and the increased vulnerability of many population 
segments to economic deprivation. 
 In addition, the poor institutional environment (e.g. poorly-designed tax laws and 
deficiencies in the capacity of tax authorities) has led to problems such as large-scale tax 
evasion and an extensive shadow economy [e.g. Berend and Bugaric 2015; Hugh and Sporri 
2007; Offe 1996; Torgler 2003]. Several scholars consider the interaction between state 
capacity and tax evasion to be a vicious circle: trust in government, satisfaction with public 
servants, and a positive evaluation of the political system correlate highly with high tax 
morale, whereas corruption hurts tax morale [Easter 2002; Torgler 2003; 2005]. 
Although politicians and policymakers in post-communist countries were strongly 
influenced by the neoliberal discourse that became rather hegemonic during the transition to a 
market economy, with respect to social policies they were generally much more cautious and 
pragmatic. First, politicians mitigated the negative social impacts of the transition to a market 
economy by creating and implementing social safety nets, unemployment protection, and 
some active labour market policies, e.g. job mediation/counselling, vocational training, and 
targeted job subsidies. Second, some countries followed a “divide and pacify” strategy 
[Vanhuysse 2006], which divided the weaker social groups so as to hinder their ability to 
unite around their interests and protest against market reforms. Third, in policy areas with 
longer social policy traditions, e.g. family policy or health care, post-communist countries 
were bound by higher degrees of path dependency as there were greater entrenched interests 
and stronger policy legacies [Saxonberg et al. 2013].  
 
Attitudes to market reforms in the West and East 
 Studies of attitudes to market reforms implemented since the 1980s in Western 
Europe, the US and Latin America have given ambiguous results. For example, studies show 
that, in the United Kingdom, the population was generally favourable toward market reforms, 
but they also displayed a tendency to hold the government responsible for economic 
circumstances [Studlar et al. 1990]. Similarly, Thompson and Elling’s [2000] study of the US 
finds that although the public was generally positive toward privatisation, most respondents 
still wanted the public sector to deliver the majority of individual services. This was 
especially true for services with a history of public provision or where regulation was a part of 
the governmental function. In the case of France, Durant and Legge [2002] confirm the 
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findings of previous studies on the UK and US that the privatisation of public services is 
driven by the elite rather than mass/median voters. Battaglio [2009] compares several 
countries with developed market economies and finds that respondents are generally 
apprehensive toward privatising certain sectors, such as electricity and hospitals (due to fears 
of rate increases and delays), but respondents in countries with systems based on common law 
are favourable toward privatising the banking sector, while those living in countries based on 
civil law oppose it.  
The Latin American population is even more in favour of revising market reforms. 
Panizza and Yañez [2005] explain the increasing discontent with market reforms as resulting 
from the low level of trust in political actors, deterioration of the economic situation, the 
change in the political orientation of the population, and the increase in political activism. In 
particular, corruption accompanying the privatisation process and increasing income 
inequalities are responsible for the dissatisfaction among the majority of the public in Latin 
American countries [e.g. Checchi et al. 2006; Davis and Coleman 2001].  
Some studies compare developed market economy countries to transition economies 
(i.e. post-communist countries). In general, people in post-communist countries are more 
resistant to market reforms and more supportive of the need for government responsibility. 
Kluegel et al. [1999] show that although in 1991 people living in post-communist countries 
(except the former East Germany) held more negative opinions of their country’s economic 
performance than those living in other European countries, they were equally or more 
strongly supportive of capitalist principles, while at the same time being more supportive of 
egalitarianism. Studies have also concluded that if the population perceives the existing 
economic order to be fair, it is much more likely to support market-based solutions. For 
example, Legge and Rainey [2003] find that there is much less support for privatisation of 
banks, hospitals, and electricity in the Bundesländer3 of the former East Germany than in the 
Bundesländer of the West. They identify three reasons for the difference in attitudes: 1) the 
negative experience with the market transformation in the post-communist countries; 2) the 
socialisation effect (people in the post-communist countries learned to rely on the government 
during the communist era); and 3) the relative absence of democratic values and lack of 
confidence in the democratic process (political efficacy). Similarly, Battaglio and Legge 
[2009] compare attitudes toward privatising the electricity industry in ten developed market 
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economies and seven post-communist countries. Their results show there is much less support 
for privatisation in post-communist countries because of the suffering people experienced 
from the market reforms, the lower level of political efficacy, and lower confidence in the 
civil servants who implement the policies.  
 Scholars that focus on post-communist countries in detail observe that public support 
for the reversal of market reforms is generally quite high, but attitudes also depend on an 
individual’s characteristics. People who possess the relevant market skills for doing well in a 
market economy (e.g. entrepreneurs and those employed in high-skilled occupations) are 
more supportive of market reforms and privatisation [Denisova et al. 2009], as are those with 
greater human capital [Denisova et al. 2012; Kaltenhalter et al. 2006]. Conversely, Rovelli 
and Zaiceva [2013] report that support for market reforms is lower among women, the 
elderly, the less educated, the unemployed, and the poor. Furthermore, people who do not 
own private property, who suffered economic hardship during the reforms, and who work in 
the public sector are also less supportive of market reforms. In other words, as the economic 
hypothesis predicts, those who benefit most are the most supportive of reforms, while those 
who suffer most are the least supportive. 
At the country level, economic factors also matter. Stronger economic growth and 
stability, decreasing inequality in income distribution, lower inflation rates, a higher share of 
the private sector, a higher share of white-collar workers, and a higher share of the population 
possessing a university degree all increase support for market reforms. Conversely, economic 
instability, high income inequality, high inflation, a higher share of blue-collar workers, and a 
greater portion of the population in retirement all decrease support for reforms [Fidrmuc 
2000; Golinelli and Rovelli 2013; Rovelli and Zaiceva 2013]. The effect of high 
unemployment may be expected to be similar. On the other hand, particularly at the beginning 
of the reforms, high unemployment may actually signal the need for more radical reforms and 
thus reinforce the support for them [Fidrmuc 1999].  
In addition to self-interest, the legitimacy of the privatisation process also influences 
support for market reforms. For example, privatisation schemes that favour outsiders are 
perceived as being more legitimate than those that favour insiders, such as management and 
employees of formerly state-owned enterprises [Denisova et al. 2012]. Furthermore, the 
performance and quality of institutions (measured by the degree of the rule of law, control of 
corruption, and quality of democracy) also increase support for market reforms and 
privatisation [Golinelli and Rovelli 2013; Denisova et al. 2012; Rovelli and Zaiceva 2013]. 
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Consequently, attitudes to market reforms are more positive if the population perceives that 
democratic institutions function well [Golinelli and Rovelli 2013; Denisova et al. 2012; 
Rovelli and Zaiceva 2013]. At the same time, paradoxically, support for redistribution also 
increases when the population perceives that the democratic institutions function well [Rovelli 
and Zaiceva 2013].  
We may also expect that trust in state institutions matters [e.g. Rothstein 1998]. The 
public’s specific experience with institutions charged with protecting the economic order 
could affect support for market principles depending on the extent to which the population 
perceives the state is operating according to ‘the rules of the game’. If people believe that the 
economic and social order is effectively protected, they might not be apprehensive about 
market reforms and thus may support them. On the other hand, people might prefer market 
reforms if they consider the state weak and ineffective, as they do not trust state institutions to 
carry out policies that would protect them; thus, they look for alternative solutions (the policy 
dissatisfaction hypothesis, see Oskarsen [2007]). Given that the post-communist countries 
suffer from a low level of trust in state institutions [Rose, Mishler and Haerpfner 1998; Rose 
2001], this hypothesis predicts that people living in these countries will be more supportive of 
market principles and reforms. Furthermore, individual and institutional factors interact: 
where democratic institutions function poorly, not much difference exists in support for 
market reforms between people with more and less market skills, while differences increase 
when the quality of governance increases. This indicates that individual competences and the 
quality of governance are complementary in increasing support for market reforms [Denisova 
et al. 2009]. 
 Meanwhile, studies conclude that people in post-communist countries are more positive 
toward redistributive policies [Dallinger 2010], welfare spending [Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 
2003] and ‘governmental action’ [Andreß and Heien 2001] than people in other European 
countries.  Even though citizens in post-communist countries often voted for right-wing 
parties because they saw it as a guarantee to prevent the communists from returning to power, 
they were still used to holding the state responsible for the welfare of the population. Thus, 
support for generous welfare policies has remained high in the post-communist countries 
[Renwick and Tóka 1998; Saxonberg 2005; 2007].  
 Two main explanations account for the strong public support for state responsibility for 
social policies in post-communist countries. The first is the communist legacy: the communist 
regimes promoted rather egalitarian policies, which created egalitarian values among the 
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population that continued after the collapse of these regimes [Andreß and Heien 2001]. 
Consequently, support for dismantling the welfare state can be expected to be low. However, 
this legacy is expected to decrease over time [Andreß and Heien 2001; Lipsmeyer and 
Nordstrom 2003], and people living in these countries may develop attitudes that are similar 
to those living in other European countries. The second explanation comes from the 
compensation hypothesis, which predicts that resistance to welfare cutbacks will increase 
because of the negative social impact of economic fluctuations or slow economic progress 
[Vis et al. 2011]. Dallinger [2010: 346] explains the comparatively high support for 
redistribution in post-communist countries: ‘If wage fairness fails, equality is expected to be 
realised by the state. If the economy fails, citizens prefer a welfare state that steps in and 
cushions the negative effects of market processes’. This means that economic affluence and 
low unemployment should make the population less concerned about the risks brought by 
market reforms, and thus increase its support for market principles, as people do not feel 
vulnerable. Conversely, economic hardship is expected to make people more resistant to 
market principles and reforms.  
In summary, these studies conclude that, despite support for general market principles 
and values, people living in post-communist countries tend to be more critical of specific 
market reforms, particularly those leading to cuts in the provision of public services and the 
elimination of the state regulatory role.  
 
Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical discussion above, we raise the following hypotheses about the post-
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe:  
H1 There is less support for market principles in post-communist countries due to the 
communist legacy (combined with fears of the impacts of economic transformation), 
particularly regarding rolling back the protective role/responsibility of the state. However, 
over time this legacy fades as young generations have lower expectations towards the state. 
H2 Support for some market principles (e.g. the principle of free competition) is greater in 
post-communist countries because of the failures experienced during the command economy. 
However, over time, support for these economic principles in post-communist countries 
converges to levels observed in other European countries, as people reflect on their own 
experience with the market economy.  
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 We expect that support for market principles in post-communist countries is 
counterbalanced by the following factors:  
H3 Support for market principles depends on specific national-economic contexts such as the 
GDP level and unemployment level. The more uncertainties or harsher conditions people 
face, the less support there is for market principles/reforms in any area (government 
protection hypothesis). Similarly, the performance of state institutions and confidence in 
institutions matter. The greater the dissatisfaction with state institutions and policies (e.g. the 
justice system, social security system), the greater is the support for market principles 
(dissatisfaction hypothesis). In addition, we hypothesise that people might reject market 
reforms because they are afraid of losing their economic affluence and standard of social 
protection (foregone gains hypothesis).  
H4 Support for market principles is associated with the uncertainties people face when 
confronted with market reforms, depending on their labour market and social status and the 
risks to which they are exposed. Thus, women, singles, people in prime age, less-educated 
persons, the unemployed, and low-income earners are less supportive of market principles.  
 
Data and methods 
The data come from the third and fourth waves of the European Value Survey [EVS 
2015], covering 22 European countries (N = 50,485) for the years 1999/2000 and 2008/2009.4 
In the survey, we identify four indicators to measure support for market economy principles. 
These measurements correspond to the principles of the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development [EBRD 2018], which produces transition indicators measuring progress in 
privatisation, governance, state-owned enterprise restructuring (deregulation), and 
competition policy, among others.5 Additionally, we include the principle of individual versus 
state responsibility that is used in the literature to measure the attitudes towards the protective 
role of the state in general [e.g. Blekesaune 2007; Miller, Hesli and Reisinger 1994]. 
                                                            
4
 The survey fieldwork for third wave was conducted during 1999 in all countries except Finland, where it was 
conducted in September 2000. The survey fieldwork for the fourth wave was carried out mostly during 2008, but 
Belgium, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Sweden and United Kingdom were conducted in the second half of 2009.  
5
 Other EBRD transition indicators like price liberalisation, and the liberalisation of trade and foreign exchange 
system, are more instrumental relative to the basic/general principles of a market economy. 
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The wording of the survey questions used in the analysis is provided in Table 1.6 All 
items are coded from 1 to 10 such that higher values always indicate more support for market 
principles: 
 1) ‘Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas’; 
(free competition principle). 
 2) ‘The state should give more freedom to firms’; (deregulation principle). 
 3) ‘Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves’. 
(individual initiative/responsibility principle). 
 4) ‘Private ownership of business and industry should be increased’ (private 
ownership principle).7 
 Since the four variables did not give a reliable score for 22 countries (Cronbach’s alfa 
is only 0.63), we analyse these items separately.  
 
Table 1 Definition of dependent variables 
Variable name  Value Description  
Competition 10 Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas 
 
1 Competition is harmful, it brings out the worst in people 
Responsibility 10 Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves 
 
1 The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided 
Firm freedom 10 The state should give more freedom to firms 
 
1 The state should control firms more effectively 
Private ownership 1 Government ownership of business and industry should be increased 
  10 Private ownership of business and industry should be increased 
Source: EVS (2015) 
 
The data allows us to study the dynamics of support for market principles in post-communist 
countries compared to other European countries. The pooled sample includes 9 countries with 
a communist past: Bulgaria (BG), Czechia (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), 
Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK), and 13 countries without a 
communist past: Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), 
                                                            
6
 The Word Value Survey also includes several suitable variables. However, in the recent wave of 2012, which 
would enable us to study the impact of the financial crisis, only seven European countries participated. EVS 
2017 data is expected to be available by the end of 2019.  
7
 This question was asked only in nine of 22 countries in year 1999. 
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France (FR), United Kingdom (GB), Ireland (IE), Iceland (IS), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), 
Portugal (PT), and Sweden (SE). 
The measures of individual-level control variables are: age, gender, education, marital 
status, household income, and employment status. To identify differences in the support for 
market principles by age, we divide age into four categories representing cohorts. The first 
age category includes persons younger than 16 as of 1990, which means ages 16-25 in 1999 
and 16-35 in 2008. The second age category identifies persons aged 16-25 in 1990, which 
means ages 26-35 in 1999 and 36-45 in 2008. The third age category includes persons aged 
26-50 in 1990, which means ages 36-60 in 1999 and 46-70 in 2008. The fourth age category 
includes persons older than 51 in 1990, which means older than 61 in 1999 and older than 71 
in 2008. We expect that persons who lived longer under communism preserve the weakest 
attitudes towards market principles. Conversely, younger cohorts in post-communist 
countries, who are not influenced by the communist legacy, are expected to have higher 
support for market principles than their counterparts in other European countries. In accord 
with Hypotheses 1 and 2, we expect the differences in the age cohort in post-communist 
countries to become narrower in the second period. 
Furthermore, we include two variables at the individual level from the EVS indicating 
the quality of government/state: confidence in the social security system and confidence in the 
justice system. Both variables are coded from 1 to 4, with the higher value indicating more 
confidence. 
We use country-level variables obtained from Eurostat (2017a, b) to analyse the 
impact of economic performance (GDP per capita, unemployment rate). The Corruption Index 
is available online at www.transparency.org/cpi. We revert the scale so that 100 identifies a 
highly corrupt and 0 a very uncorrupt country. Table 2 shows the mean values of country-
level variables in two periods. The observed patterns confirm a high degree of convergence 
between post-communist countries and other Europe, although the gap in GDP and corruption 
still remains visible, while the average unemployment rates have completely converged in the 
second period.  
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Table 2 Country-level characteristics: post-communist countries vs. other Europe 
  GDP   Unemployment rate   CPI    
 
mean sd mean sd mean sd 
1999             
post-communist 8.3 0.5 12.1 3.6 55.4 8.9 
other Europe 10.1 0.2 8.0 2.8 25.5 17.3 
2008             
post-communist 9.3 0.3 6.4 1.6 48.1 9.0 
other Europe 10.4 0.2 6.5 2.1 23.6 13.1 
Source: Eurostat (2017a, b), Transparency International 
 
The household income variable in the EVS is a categorical variable that provides 
comparability across countries. Income is measured on a three-point scale: low, middle, and 
high. However, 18 per cent of the cases are missing. To avoid biased estimates, we opted for 
the multiple imputations approach, which creates multiple imputed datasets, taking into 
account the clustered structure of the data [Raghunathan et al. 2001].8 The weight in the EVS 
is constructed for all national datasets on the basis of gender and age categories. We apply 
weight in the analyses to correct for the limitation that not all individuals from the population 
were given equal chances to participate in the survey. 
 
Findings 
In this section, we first analyse the aggregate results and then present the results of our multi-
level regressions.  
Development of support for market economy principles during 1999-2008 in Europe 
First, we examine the mean scores for the support for market principles in post-communist 
countries and other Europe in two periods. Table 3 shows the country-means for all three 
variables along with minimum and maximum values. Interestingly, the support for market 
principles is the highest in competition and lowest in firm freedom. In 1999, most of the post-
communist countries were among the leaders in support for free competition, but the gap 
narrows in the second period. Figure 1 illustrates that, relative to other variables, the 
competition mean scores remain very robust, i.e. the position of countries remains close to the 
45 degree line indicating little change over time. Support for competition is the lowest in the 
                                                            
8
 We use Stata 13 to perform the imputation and the estimation of the main model. 
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countries of Western Europe (i.e. Belgium, France, Netherlands) and Southern Europe (i.e. 
Italy, Portugal, Spain). 
Support for firm freedom has the lowest mean scores of the three variables. This 
variable also shows the largest gap between post-communist countries and other Europe, with 
respondents living in other Europe being much more supportive. However, this variable also 
shows the greatest convergence over time. Figure 1 illustrates the diverse trajectories in the 
support for firm freedom. The scores have increased in many post-communist countries but 
have decreased in most countries in other Europe over time. However, the lowest mean scores 
remain in the post-communist countries (i.e. support remains below 5 in Hungary, Latvia, and 
Slovakia).  
Support for individual responsibility instead of government responsibility has 
increased considerably in the post-communist countries from 5.2 to 5.9. Figure 1 shows that 
support for individual responsibility remains extremely low in Spain and Italy. 
Support for private ownership instead of state ownership is considerably lower in post-
communist countries, but the difference decreased slightly between 1999 and 2008, when 
support decreased more in the other European countries than in post-communist countries.9  
 
Table 3 Support for market economy principles (1-10 scale) 
  
Competition Firm freedom Responsibility Private ownership 
 
mean min max mean min max mean min max mean min max 
1999 
                        
post-communist 7.3 6.7 7.8 4.9 3.7 6.5 5.2 4.4 6.1 5.8 5.3 6.3 
other Europe 6.9 6.2 8.3 6.2 5.3 7.6 6.3 5.3 7.0 6.8 6.3 7.3 
2008                         
post-communist 7.1 6.6 7.8 5.2 4.4 5.8 5.9 5.4 6.4 5.6 4.8 6.3 
other Europe 6.9 6.0 7.9 5.8 5.1 6.5 6.4 5.3 7.2 6.3 5.5 6.8 
 Note: See Table 1 for the definition of variables. Design weights are applied. 
 
Notably, attitudes between post-communist countries and other Europe are converging 
on all four questions. Nevertheless, support for most economic principles (i.e. individual 
responsibility, private ownership, and deregulation/freedom for firms) remains lower in post-
communist countries than in other Europe.  
                                                            
9
 This question was not asked in nine countries (of which four were post-communist countries) and therefore the 
results for 1999 must be viewed with caution. 
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Figure 1 Country averages for the support for market economy principles 
 
Note: Scores marked with a cross and dot indicate post-communist countries and other 
Europe, respectively.  
 
The results are compatible with our Hypotheses 1 and 2 about post-communist 
countries having different attitudes toward market principles. There is more support for state 
responsibility in providing for people in post-communist countries than in other Europe, but at 
the same time, also considerably more support for market competition. The differences can be 
attributed to the communist legacy, but over time post-communist countries have been 
converging to other Europe, where support for market principles has remained rather stable. 
The results for the firm freedom (vs. state control) variable and support for private ownership 
variable are surprising: in 1999 there was much lower support for market principles in the 
post-communist countries. A possible explanation for the low support for these principles may 
be the public’s experience with the weakly-controlled, non-transparent privatisation schemes 
and widespread tax evasion during the 1990s that made people more supportive of state 
control (the government protection hypothesis). However, over time post-communist 
countries converged towards other Europe, as support for firm freedom and private ownership 
increased, while in advanced economies, fears resulting from the financial crisis – already felt 
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at the time of the 2008/9 EVS survey – spurred public support both for greater state control 
over firms and for state ownership.  
 
Multilevel regressions: The factors/drivers of support for market principles  
We apply multilevel regression models to study the level of support for market principles in 
post-communist countries and other Europe. The models are estimated separately in two 
periods to allow for the comparison of predictors between 1999 and 2008. We add interaction 
terms for all explanatory variables with post-communist countries to test if correlations are 
statistically different from other Europe. Adding the interaction terms to the model changes 
the interpretation of the coefficients. The direct effects relate to the countries in other Europe. 
The effect of the variable in post-communist countries is given by the sum of the direct effect 
and the interaction effect. We discuss the overall significance of the effect below.  
Individual-level variables 
Estimates on the individual-level variables confirm Hypothesis 4 concerning economic self-
interest. People who are less exposed to the potential risks emerging from reforms based on 
market principles are more supportive of market principles than others. In contrast, women, 
people in prime working age, the less-educated, the unemployed, and those with lower 
incomes – and, in some respects, singles – all support market principles less than others. In 
post-communist countries, single and better educated individuals show consistently more 
support for market principles, though the differences become milder in the second period. In 
1999, affluent individuals in post-communist countries were more supportive of private 
ownership, firm freedom, and individual responsibility compared to their peers in other 
Europe. However, the gap disappears in the second period except for support for private 
ownership, where the gap remained. The age cohort dummy confirms that older generations 
who spent their lives under communism are substantially less supportive of market principles. 
In other Europe, by contrast, the older generations are more supportive of market principles 
than the younger age cohorts. The youngest cohorts in the post-communist countries show 
more support for private ownership, firm freedom, and individual responsibility, but less 
support for competition as they are less influenced by the legacy of communism. As the 
communist legacy hypothesis predicts, in the post-communist countries market principles are 
more embedded in younger generations, which are less influenced by the communist legacy. 
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Table 4 Estimates from pooled sample 
  Competition     Firm freedom     Responsibility     Private ownership   
1999   2008   1999   2008   1999   2008   1999   2008   
Female -0.29*** 0.04 -0.30*** 0.04 -0.20*** 0.05 -0.14*** 0.04 -0.17*** 0.05 -0.25*** 0.04 -0.30*** 0.05 -0.26*** 0.04 
Single -0.15** 0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.01 0.06 0 0.06 -0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.06 -0.1 0.07 -0.05 0.05 
Edu - middle 0.20*** 0.05 0.14*** 0.05 0.24*** 0.06 0.17*** 0.05 0.19*** 0.06 0.36*** 0.06 0.23*** 0.06 0.03 0.05 
Edu - high 0.11* 0.06 0.09* 0.05 0.22*** 0.06 0.10* 0.06 0.15** 0.06 0.31*** 0.06 0.23*** 0.07 -0.05 0.05 
Age 0-15 in 1990 0.21*** 0.08 0.23*** 0.05 -0.03 0.09 0.13** 0.06 -0.01 0.09 -0.13** 0.06 -0.04 0.1 -0.02 0.05 
Age 16-25 in 1990 0.16** 0.06 0.10* 0.05 0.15** 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.13** 0.06 -0.08 0.06 0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.05 
Age 50+ in 1990 0.43*** 0.07 0.40*** 0.07 0.28*** 0.07 0.1 0.08 0.50*** 0.07 0.20** 0.08 0.31*** 0.08 0.16** 0.07 
Employed  0.19*** 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.27*** 0.06 0.15*** 0.05 0.21*** 0.06 0.09* 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.11** 0.04 
Income middle 0.08 0.06 0.13** 0.06 0.1 0.06 0.10* 0.06 0.19*** 0.06 0.26*** 0.06 0.1 0.07 0.17*** 0.05 
Income high 0.23*** 0.07 0.41*** 0.06 0.37*** 0.07 0.49*** 0.07 0.45*** 0.07 0.54*** 0.07 0.35*** 0.08 0.48*** 0.06 
Confidence in Justice  0.20*** 0.03 0.15*** 0.03 0.21*** 0.03 0.15*** 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0 0.03 
Conf. in Soc. Sec. Sys. -0.12*** 0.03 -0.10*** 0.03 -0.21*** 0.03 -0.17*** 0.03 0 0.03 -0.08*** 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.03 
GDP, log 0.27** 0.14 -0.82*** 0.14 0.90*** 0.14 -0.74*** 0.16 0.46*** 0.15 -0.89*** 0.16 0.81*** 0.16 -0.06 0.14 
Unempl. rate % -0.02 0.01 -0.10*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.13*** 0.01 
Corruption index /100 -1.07*** 0.16 -1.61*** 0.24 -1.46*** 0.17 -2.36*** 0.26 -1.50*** 0.17 -3.06*** 0.26 0.50** 0.21 0.78*** 0.23 
CEE dummy -1.46 1.85 -2.3 1.93 15.76*** 2 -13.73*** 2.22 7.61*** 2.03 -13.86*** 2.19 43.68*** 7.99 -9.96*** 1.97 
Constant 4.11*** 1.42 15.98*** 1.51 -3.17** 1.43 13.97*** 1.72 1.65 1.53 15.97*** 1.72 -1.75 1.68 7.54*** 1.49 
Interaction terms for post-communist countries 
Female 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.06 -0.09 0.08 -0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 -0.04 0.07 -0.14 0.1 -0.04 0.06 
Single 0.28** 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.29** 0.13 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.13 0.19** 0.09 0.27* 0.16 0.18** 0.08 
Edu - middle 0.19** 0.09 0.22*** 0.08 0.26*** 0.1 0.25*** 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.08 0.09 0.19 0.12 0.24*** 0.08 
Edu - high 0.56*** 0.1 0.38*** 0.09 0.89*** 0.12 0.74*** 0.1 0.62*** 0.11 0.51*** 0.1 0.84*** 0.14 0.71*** 0.09 
Age 0-15 in 1990 -0.1 0.14 -0.20** 0.08 0.28* 0.16 0.24** 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.17* 0.09 0.49** 0.2 0.39*** 0.08 
Age 16-25 in 1990 0.03 0.1 -0.13 0.08 0.27** 0.12 0.12 0.09 -0.02 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.63*** 0.14 0.26*** 0.08 
Age 50+ in 1990 -0.36*** 0.11 -0.44*** 0.11 -0.39*** 0.12 -0.27** 0.12 -0.29** 0.12 -0.18 0.13 -0.2 0.16 -0.32*** 0.12 
Employed  -0.1 0.09 -0.01 0.07 -0.26** 0.1 -0.04 0.08 0.12 0.1 -0.03 0.08 0.05 0.13 -0.06 0.07 
Income middle -0.08 0.1 -0.04 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.20* 0.11 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.15 0.08 0.08 
Income high 0 0.12 -0.06 0.1 0.24** 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.22* 0.12 0.07 0.1 0.08 0.16 -0.02 0.09 
Confidence in Justice  -0.19*** 0.05 -0.17*** 0.04 -0.20*** 0.06 0.17*** 0.05 -0.08 0.05 0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.07 0.15*** 0.04 
Conf. in Soc. Sec. Sys. 0.17*** 0.05 0.22*** 0.04 0.24*** 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.17*** 0.05 0.22*** 0.08 0.02 0.04 
GDP, log 0.08 0.18 0.15 0.18 -1.62*** 0.19 1.19*** 0.21 -1.02*** 0.19 1.15*** 0.2 -4.49*** 0.8 0.81*** 0.18 
Unempl. rate % -0.07*** 0.02 0.08*** 0.02 -0.09*** 0.02 -0.13*** 0.02 -0.11*** 0.02 -0.05** 0.02 -0.50*** 0.07 -0.01 0.02 
Corruption index /100 5.25*** 0.5 0.08 0.49 -1.73*** 0.58 3.79*** 0.54 3.96*** 0.54 4.21*** 0.55 -1.49 1.08 1.30*** 0.5 
N 23125   27360   23125   27360   23125   27360   13812   26453   
 Source: EVS [2015], Eurostat [2017a,b], own calculations. 
Note: Observations weighted by design weights. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors 
are presented next to coefficients. *p = 0.1; **p = 0.05; ***p = 0.01 
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Country-level variables 
The economic context is a significant predictor of support for market principles. The GDP 
level shows a positive correlation in other Europe in 1999, which confirms the protection 
hypothesis that economic affluence decreases people’s fears about the negative impacts of 
market reforms. However, the correlation became negative in 2008, and insignificant in the 
case of support for private ownership. We assume that on the eve of the global financial crisis, 
people in richer countries might have been more concerned about considerable losses in the 
value of their assets and in living standards than people in less affluent countries and, 
consequently, they became less supportive of market principles (the foregone assets 
hypothesis). In the post-communist countries, by contrast, the correlation changed from 
negative to positive: at the end of the 1990s, hopes for more economic affluence combined 
with the prevalent neoliberal public discourse triggered support for market principles among 
those living in these countries. However, in 2008 the actual level of affluence achieved 
mattered, as those living in post-communist countries perceived wealth to provide protection 
against the consequences of market reforms. Thus, by 2008 attitudes in the post-communist 
countries had become similar to those in other European countries (government protection 
hypothesis). In 1999, the unemployment level is insignificant or positively correlated with 
support for market reforms in the sample of all countries, but not amongst post-communist 
countries, where it is negatively correlated. In 2008, however, it becomes negative and a 
significant predictor of support for market principles regarding competition and firm freedom, 
as Hypothesis 3 predicts: With the coming financial crisis, people in other European 
countries, where unemployment is higher, are less supportive of market principles as they feel 
more vulnerable (the government protection hypothesis). The exception is support for private 
ownership, which remains strong in spite of high unemployment rates. In the post-communist 
countries, this relationship is even stronger, leading to a significant and negative correlation of 
support for market principles with unemployment in both periods, except support for private 
ownership which becomes insignificant in 2008. That is, except for the issue of private 
ownership, the higher the unemployment rate is, the lesser the support for market principles. 
This also confirms the relevance of the government protection hypothesis.  
The corruption level has a negative association with support for market principles for 
both periods in other Europe. This means that the government protection hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 3) holds: When corruption is low, people trust the state to be able to ensure the 
functioning of the economic and social order, and they are not afraid to support market 
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reforms. When corruption is high, however, people fear the impact of implementing market 
principles and prefer to have the state protect the economic and social order. Support for 
private ownership is an exception, as it is positively correlated with the corruption index. 
People probably believe that private ownership provides less opportunity for public servants 
to engage in corruption. In post-communist countries, by contrast, the correlation of 
corruption level is significant and positive for supporting market principles, except when it 
comes to support for firm freedom and for private ownership in 1999, and support for 
competition in 2008. This indicates that the policy disaffection hypothesis is more relevant in 
post-communist countries: people are more supportive of market principles when corruption 
is high, as they probably do not trust the state’s ability to guarantee the economic and social 
order. 
Confidence in the social security system is a significant and negatively correlated 
predictor of support for market principles in the non-post communist countries for both 
periods except for support for private ownership which is an insignificant predictor. This 
means that if people trust the social security system to protect them effectively, they are less 
supportive of market reforms because they are afraid of losing the protection provided by the 
system (the foregone gains hypothesis). In post-communist countries, by contrast, the sum of 
the direct effect and the interaction effect for the social security system is not significant in 
1999 (except for support for the case of individual responsibility). The effect is identified as 
positive and significant in 2008 for competition and individual responsibility variables and 
thus the government protection hypothesis is more relevant for those living in post-communist 
countries: People support market principles when they feel protected against the negative 
consequences of the reforms.  
Confidence in the justice system is a significant, positive predictor of support for the 
market principles of competition and firm freedom but is insignificant in the case of state 
responsibility and private ownership. This means that if people in countries without a 
communist past feel that the economic and social order is ensured effectively by the justice 
system, they tend to support market principles more. If they perceive the justice system to be 
ineffective and do not trust it, they are less likely to accept some market principles: 
competition and firm freedom. Interestingly, in post-communist countries, the correlation for 
1999 is zero (i.e. the sum of the direct effect and the interaction effect is statistically not 
different from zero). This means that public support for market principles is not related to 
confidence in the justice system. However, in 2008 there is a positive correlation of trust in 
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the justice system and support for firm freedom, private ownership, and state responsibility, 
but the correlation is insignificant between the trust in the justice system and support for free 
market competition. These results provide further support for a convergence between post-
communist countries and other Europe. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we show the diminishing effects of the communist legacy in the support for 
market principles and reforms. In 1999, a decade after the fall of the Iron Curtain, support for 
individual responsibility was lower in the post-communist countries than in other European 
countries, as residents were more positive to the idea that the state should take care of them. 
Similarly, support for firm freedom and private ownership was also lower in countries with a 
communist past, although we argue this is not because of the communist legacy, but rather 
experience during the transition period, such as uncontrolled privatisation that was linked to 
widespread corruption. However, people living in post-communist countries are more 
supportive of free competition than their peers in other European countries, since this 
principle, in their perceptions, sharply contrasts with the poorly performing command 
economy. As predicted by the communist legacy hypothesis, support for market principles in 
the post-communist countries has converged to levels in other European countries. This 
means that support for free competition has declined and support for individual responsibility 
and firm freedom has increased, although it still remains at lower levels relative to the other 
European countries. Support for private ownership decreased less than in the other European 
countries.  
 The individual-level variables explain the uncertainties and risks that people may face 
when confronted with market reforms (depending on their labour market and social status). 
We find less support for market principles among women, singles, people in their prime age, 
the less-educated, the unemployed, and people with low income. These differences are more 
pronounced in the post-communist countries. Further, the age cohort effect is significant in 
post-communist countries as young generations are more supportive of market principles than 
people who lived longer periods of their lives under communist rule. 
 Support for market principles further depends on the economic, societal, political, and 
institutional features of their country-specific contexts. Thus, one must be cautious in 
interpreting these results as the interplay of the country-level variables seems to be complex. 
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First, as the government protection hypothesis predicts, support for market reforms is greater 
when people feel more protected against the negative consequences of market reforms. 
Second, there is a positive correlation between trust in institutions and support for market 
principles. Third, according to the foregone assets hypothesis, the fear of losing assets due to 
market reforms is higher when a country has a higher level of economic affluence and when 
social protection is better. Under these circumstances, people are less supportive of market 
reforms, in particular, in times when they foresee an imminent economic recession.  
Our findings indicate that in post-communist countries (1) the communist legacy 
matters (support for market principles is accompanied by greater support for state 
responsibility to provide for people), but this legacy is losing strength; (2) the experience of 
corruption and poorly-regulated privatisation during the transformation period makes people 
reluctant to adopt market principles; (3) the effects of the country-level variables are mostly 
consistent with the government protection hypothesis10, except for the policy disaffection 
effect associated with perceptions of high corruption. This means that if people believe they 
are protected by the social security system or they feel more affluent, then support for market 
principles is greater. In other European countries, support for market principles is lower when 
corruption levels are higher, except support for private ownership, which increases with the 
corruption index; people are probably afraid that public officials may abuse public ownership. 
Support for market principles is also lower when there is less trust in the social security 
system. In other words, if levels of corruption are low and levels of trust in the social security 
system high, then people residing in other European countries are more likely to support most 
of the market reforms because they assume the reforms will be implemented in a proper and 
ethical manner that does not favour certain groups. In addition, they trust the social security 
system to be able to compensate them if their socio-economic situation deteriorates due to the 
reforms. 
In this respect, we find that both the legacy of communism and the economic hardship 
of the transition play a role in making people more sensitive to economic risk, and thus 
decrease support for market reforms and increase demand for government protection. 
However, as the communist legacy hypothesis predicts, the differences between post-
communist countries and other European countries are diminishing. The fifth wave of EVS 
                                                            
10
 That is, people want more state responsibility when they feel less affluent and poorly protected against 
economic risks. 
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2017, when released, will enable us to examine if this trend continues and to study the 
economic hardship and other negative societal consequences brought by the crisis.  
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